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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
STATEMENT CONCERNING INTEREST OF
AMICUS CURIAE IN ISSUES BEFORE THE
COURT.
"Underground water in the United States is a
significant source of an increasingly precious commodity; nearly one-fifth of the country's withdrawal needs were met from underground supplies
in 1963, and the proportion is expected to reach onehalf in the foreseeable future. In 1960, six and onethird billion gallons were taken each day from sub-
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surface sources, a consumption double that of a
scant fifteen years ago." University of Colorado
Law Review, Volume 40, Number One, Page 133.
It is axiomatic that underground water is important to
the development and growth of Utah, to Salt Lake County,
to those who reside therein, and to the industries and other
operations which maintain our modern economy.
Kennecott Copper Corporation, but one example, is a
corporate resident of Salt Lake County, where it has an
integrated copper mining industry. To accomplish the necessary mining, leaching, concentrating, smelting and refining, Kennecott uses about 72,000 gallons of water per minute. There are a number of sources for this water, but approximately 44 percent comes from the underground water
basin of Salt Lake County.
A few years ago, Kennecott processed 90,000 tons of
ore per day. Now it is treating 18,000 tons more of ore per
day. With this increased expansion came a need for more
water. The surface waters of Salt Lake County had been
fully appropriated, but one significant available source for
additional water was the ground water basin. If Kennecott
and all others desiring to utilize the available underground
water are to do so efficiently, filing proper applications to
appropriate or Change Applications with the State Engineer, the State Engineer should not be frustrated in his
administration of the water source in the general public
interest by court decisions which seem to hold that those
who have rights to divert water from a ground water basin
are also entitled to the absolute right to have the hydro-
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static pressure that happened to be present at the time of
the original appropriation maintained regardless of the
reasonableness or efficiency of his diversion.
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE DISCUSSED
When the Amicus Curiae Petition was filed seeking
permission to appear before the Supreme Court in this
case, three questions were to be discussed as follows:
(1)

Do owners of rights to the use of underground
water by means of flowing wells have a vested
right to the hydrostatic pressure in their wells
such that they can enjoin other owners of rights
from the same sources from improving their
methods of diversion if the effect of such improvement is to lower the hydrostatic pressure
in other wells?

(2)

Does the owner of a right to divert and use underground water by means of wells have the
right under Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated
1953 to alter and change his means or method of
diversion by equipping the same with pumps, if
necessary, to continue the full use of his water
right even though as a result of such alteration
or change the hydrostatic pressure in other wells
might be lowered thereby?

(3)

Does an established right to divert water from
an underground source entitle the owner thereof
to an unqualified right to the continued artesian
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pressure as his means of diversion, or is such
right limited to a means or method of diversion
which is reasonable and consistent with the state
of development in the area in which he obtains
his water?
An examination of those questions makes it clear that
there is really but one fundamental question which evolves
from the three noted above:
Does an established vested right to divert water
from an underground source entitle the owner
thereof to an unqualified right to the continued artesian pressure as his means of diversion, or is such
right limited to a means or method of diversion
which is reasonable and consistent with the state
of development in the area in which he obtains his
water?
ARGUMENT
AN ESTABLISHED VESTED RIGHT TO DIVERT WATER FROM AN UNDERGROUND
SOURCE IS LIMITED TO A MEANS OR
METHOD OF DIVERSION WHICH IS REASONABLE AND CONSISTENT WITH THE
STATE OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA
IN WHICH ONE OBTAINS HIS WATER.
Mr. Justice Latimer in the case of Hanson v. Salt Lake
City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 established the point of
departure for our argument when he said at page 442:
"It is my belief that the development of artesian water in this state has reached a point where
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we should only protect the prior appropriator when
his means of diversion are reasonable and consistent with the state of development in the area in
which he obtains his water."
The thrust of Judge Latimer's opinion was to assert
that if a highly developed underground water basin is to
be fully and efficiently developed, the prior appropriator
should not be entitled absolutely to his hydrostatic pressure.
In the case of Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews,
9 U.2d 234, 344 P.2d 528, Mr. Justic Crockett discussed
the problem of maximum development of an underground
water basin at page 334:
"The difficulty with preserving to the prior
user the absolute right to waiter and also to the
pressure and means of diversion is that projecting
its application to basins where there are a great
number of users reveals that it dctes not work to
serve the necessary purpose of maximum development and use of water. The evidence indicates and
it is a well-known and observable fact, that when
the water table of an underground basin is maintained at a high enough level to sustain pressure in
flowing wells in the higher areas, there will be
water above and near the surface in the lower areas
forming ponds, marshes and swamps. This results
in wasteful losses from surface evaporation and
from consumption by water-loving plants, tules,
reeds and rushes, indigenous to such areas, which
are of little or no value. There is often further
wastage from drainage of the basin by streams or
by leakage and seepage out of it."
In the case immediately before the Court, we are concerned with the proper interpretation of Section 73-3-3,
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U.C.A. 1953, and more particularly the first sentence which
reads as follows:
"Any person entitled to the use of water may
change the place of diversion or use and may use
the water for other purposes than those for which
it was originally appropriated but no such change
shall be made if it impairs any vested right without
just compensation."
The term "any vested right" is not defined by statute. However, this Court in three cases (Justesen v. Olsen, 86 Utah
158, 40 P.2d 802; Hanson v. Salt Lake City, supra; and
Current Creek Irrigation Co. V. Andrews, supra) has provided guidance as to what a vested right to underground
water means. None of those cases involved a Change Application under Section 73-3-3, but those cases cannot be
ignored in reaching a conclusion as to disposal of this
matter now before the court.
In searching for a definition of "vested right" as it
relates to ground water, we must be cognizant that the
Utah Legislature has provided that all waters in this state,
whether above or under the ground are declared to be the
property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the
use thereof. Section 73-1-1, U.C.A. 1953. This Court has
held that it is contrary to public policy in Utah to permit
wa^te of water (Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 U. 50, 59, 40 P.2d
755) and that conservation of water is of utmost importance to public welfare in Utah (Brian v. Fremont Irrigaction Co., 112 U. 220, 186 P.2d 588). In American Fork
Irr. Co., et al. V. Linke, et al, 121 U. 90, 97, 239 P.2d 188,
this Court said:
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"Plaintiff's proposal, if completed without impairing vested rights, contemplates the more beneficial use of water, a most desired result fully consistent with progress and change, and reflecting the
established policy of this state."
Utah's water statutes clearly enjoin upon the State the
duty to control the appropriation of the public waters in a
manner that will be for the best interests of the public.
Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 506, 136 P.2d 957. What
the Legislature obviously desired was full development and
beneficial use of the water of Utah with as little waste as
possible. That would seem to have been and now is the
basic theory followed by this Court. It is respectfully submitted that the Court in this case should now establish
clearly the rule of reason applicable to water diversion
which would allow the fullest and best use of ground water
in the State of Utah. It seems clear that the Court should
reject the concept that when one seeks to change his ground
water right and make the means of diversion more efficient, as the applicant did here, even though the hydrostatic pressure of others who have water rights is lowered
by such a change, the Change Applicant is absolutely responsible for replacing the pressure or ceasing operations,
or acquiring the right so affected. While Kennecott economically could meet this requirement, still Utah's basins
wil not be fully developed for the general public because
few, if any, such applicants would be able to insure those
with sudh vested rights the right to have the same pressure
maintained. The better rule would seem to be that a "vested
right" to underground water entitles one owning the right
to use of the water, but nevertheless, the means of diversion
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must continue to be reasonable and consistent with the
state of development of water in the area, and not detrimental to the overall purpose of putting all of the usable
water in the basin to use.
Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water
Rights in the West, recognized this problem at page 179
when he stated:
"On the whole, it seems obvious that to accord
the first appropriator under a ground-water administrative statute the right to have the water level
maintained at the point at which he first pumps it,
or damages in lieu thereof, so long as there is an
adequate water supply of equivalent quality available at lower depths from which it is feasible to
pump, would unduly complicate the administration
of waiter rights in the area and might seriously curtail the fullest utilization of the ground-water supply, for later uses under such a handicap may prove
to be economically impracticable. This result would
be out of line with the purpose of the statute. Accordingly these factors and implications are worthy
of consideration in determining the question of reasonableness of the first appropriator's diversion under such circumstances."
A number of western State Legislatures have attempted
to define "vested right'' as it applies to underground water
and these statutes should be helpful in view of the fact that
Utah has no statute defining the term.
Alaska in 1966 adopted Section 46.15.050 which provides:
"Priority of appropriation gives prior right.
Priority of appropriation does not include the right
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to prevent changes in the condition of water occurrence, such as the increase or decrease of stream
flow, or the lowering of a water table, artesian pressure, or water level, by later appropriators, if the
prior appropriator can reasonably acquire his water
under the changed conditions."
The State of Colorado:
". . . declared that the traditional policy of
the state of Colorado, requiring the water resources
of this state to be devoted to beneficial use in reasonable amounts through appropriation, is affirmed
with respect to the designated ground waters of
this state, as said waters are defined in section 14818-2(3). While the doctrine of prior appropriation
is recognized, such doctrine should be modified to
permit the full economic development of designated
ground water resources. Prior appropriations of
ground water should be protected and reasonable
ground water pumping levels maintained, but not
to include the maintenance of historical water levels." 148-18-1, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963.
Idaho's Legislature stated in Section 42-226, Idaho
Code, as follows:
"It is hereby declared that the traditional policy of the state of Idaho, requiring the water resources of this state to be devoted to beneficM use
in reasonable amounts through appropriation, is affirmed with respect to the ground water resources
of this state as said term is hereinafter defined:
and, while the doctrine of 'first in time is first in
right' is recognized, a reasonable exercise of this
right shall not block full economic development of
underground water resources, but early appropriators of underground water shall be protected in the
maintenance of reasonable ground water pumping
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levels as may be established by the state reclamation engineer as herein provided."
Kansas has a detailed guide for its Chief Engineer;
Section 82a-711 provides:
"With regard to whether a proposed use will
impair a use under an existing water right, impairment shall include the unreasonable raising or lowering of the static water level or the unreasonable
increase or decrease of the streamflow or the unreasonable deterioration of the water quality at the
water user's point of diversion beyond a reasonable
economic limit."
Section 82a-711a of the Kansas law contains express
conditions for appropriations as follows:
"It shall be an express condition of each appropriation of surface or ground water that the
right of the appropriator shall relate to a specific
quantity of water and that such right must allow
for a reasonable raising or lowering of the static
water level and for the reasonable increase or decrease of the streamflow at the appropriator's point
of diversion: Provided, That in determining such
reasonable raising or lowering of the static water
level in a particular area, the chief engineer shall
consider the economics of diverting or pumping
water for the water uses involved; and nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the granting of permits to applicants later in time on the ground that
the diversions under such proposed later appropriations may cause the water level to be raised or lowered at the point of diversion of a prior appropriator, so long as the rights of holders of existing
water rights can be satisfied under such express
conditions."
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Section 41-141 of the Wyoming Statutes passed in 1957
is also clear in its limiting conditions:
"It shall be an express condition of each permit
and of each appropriation of underground water acquired thereunder that the right of the appropriator does not include the right to have the water
level of artesian pressure at the appropriator's
point of diversion maintained at any level higher
than that required for maximum beneficial use of
the water in the source of supply. The state engineer may issue any permit subject to such conditions as he may find to be in the public interest."
In defining a water right in Montana, Section 89-2912
declares that:
"Appropriative rights shall relate only to quantities of water for beneficial uses and not to water
levels, means of use, or ease of withdrawal, . , ."
Nevada has also recognized that an underground water
appropriation does not entitle one to the hydrostatic pressure that was present when the water was originally appropriated. Section 534.110, Nevada Revised Statutes, is
the one to which we direct the Court's attention :
"4. It shall be an express condition of each
appropriation of ground water acquired under NRS
534.010 to 534.190, inclusive, that the right of the
appropriator shall relate to a specific quantity of
water and that such right must allow for a reasonable lowering of the static water level at the appropriator's pqint of diversion. In determining such
reasonable lowering of the static water level in a
particular area, the state engineer shall consider
the economics of pumping water for the general
type of crops growing and may also consider the
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effect of water use on the economy of the area in
general.
"5. Nothing herein shall be so construed as
to prevent the granting of permits to applicants
later in time on the ground that the diversion under
such proposed later appropriations may cause the
water level to be lowered at the point of diversion
of a prior appropriator, so long as the rights of
holders of existing appropriations can be saMsfied
under such express conditions."
All of the above statutes have been noted because such
legislation clearly indicates that the Western States are
attempting to provide a rule of reason to achieve full beneficial and efficient development of underground water
basins. It is significant that each of those States have
adopted the modern ground water concept as espoused by
Wells A. Hutchins as far back as 1942.
The majority in Hanson v. Salt Lake City, supra, at
page 422 seemed initially to recognize that the means of
diversion must be reasonable when it was said at page 422:
"We conclude that the water of artesian basins
are subject to appropriation in Ithis state and that
the first appropriator obtains a prior ri^ht to the
use of such waters over subsequent appropriators,
and that includes his means of diversion as long as
such means are reasonably efficient and do not unreasonably waste water."
However, the court then went on to decide that a subsequent appropriator must bear the additional cost of lifting sufficient water to a prior appropriator if the subsequent ground water appropriator reduces the static head
pressure.
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We submit that the rationale of the judges who concurred only in the result in the case of Hanson v. Salt Lake
City, supra, is more in keeping with maximum development
of an underground water basin.
Mr. Justice Wolfe on page 434 commented:
"I realize that first in time is first in right
both as to surface and ground waters. But I agree
with Mr. Justice LATIMER that first in right does
not mean that antiquated means of diversion is a
part of that prior right."
Further on page 436 he said:
'Trior appropriators by first tapping the basin
might reap the benefit of a static head sufficient to
bring the water diverted to the surface, but to require all subsequent appropriators to preserve this
means of bringing the water to the surface would be
to require them to preserve the static head, and
thereby prevent the widest use of that underground
water, or introduce impractical problems of allocating among numerous subsequent appropriators the
amount of impairment each caused to the static
head of a prior user or users. I think the tendency
is, even in truly artesian basins ('artesian' accurately used applies to water which on being tapped,
naturally rises to the surface although the term is
loosely used to apply to any area where deep wells
are drilled and water is pumped) to require all users
to put in pumps in order to prevent waste."
Finally, on page 439, let us look at the last paragraph
of Justice Wolfe's opinion:
"Naturally when supply is depleted in any vessel large or small, static pressure is lowered. But
it does not follow that, because the static pressure is
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lowered, the user has been legally injured if he can
by reasonable means still obtain the amount of water he appropriated. Under the policy making as
much water as possible available for use and encouraging its use, he cannot insist that the static
pressure existing at the time of his appropriation be
maintained, or that a subsequent appropriator pay
the cost of pumping apparatus to take the place of
the lost pressure. He must, as Mr. Justice LATIMER states, use that means of transporting water
to the surface which serves the above policy if under the circumstances and period, and in view of
the rights of other appropriators, both prior and
subsequent, it is a reasonable method."
Judge Latimer's thesis is summarized in the last three
paragraphs of his opinion at pages 445 and 446:
"If we are to protect the prior appropriator
under all circumstances, then the prior appropriator can require damages from every subsequent appropriator and each subsequent appropriator in
turn, can require damages from all subsequent appropriators, until the last one would have to pay
tribute to all. If the waters of the Jordan River
Basin are to be utilized to the fullest extent, then
it must be recognized that some lowering of the
water table or static head will result when each wdl
is drilled; and that such a result cannot be avoided
if use is to be made of the water now going to waste.
If the present appropriators of artesian water have
the right to retain the pressure now present in the
basin, then I see no escape from the conclusion that
in the future, it will not be economical and feasible
to drill wells in this basin.
"Moreover, unless we adopt the principle that
prior appropriators must use reasonable means of
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diversion, I am unable to determine how the State
Engineer can carry out the functions delegated to
to him by the 1935 Legislature. He is authorized to
permit citizens of this state to appropriate unappropriated waters and under the evidence of Dr.
Marsell, there exists a minimum of 165 cubic feet
per second of unappropriated water in this basin.
If the State Engineer must require subsequent appropriators to pay tribute to all prior appropriators
of water in the area, then we cannot reasonably expect newcomers to assume this burden.
"The record does not convince me that the
method of diversion used by the plaintiff in this
case is reasonable under the facts and circumstances. I, therefore, feel that the cost of making
his diversion reasonable should be borne by him and
not by the city. He should be protected in the quantity of water he has appropriated and is beneficially
using, but I believe that even though his original
means of diversion may have been reasonable, it
now should be changed to one consistent with the
developments in the area, and that he should be
required to assume the additional costs imposed on
him by virtue of the changed conditions."
In 1959 the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Current
Creek Irrigation Co, v. Andreivs, supra, considered the
problem of whether or not prior appropriators from an
underground basin have a vested right to continue receiving water by artesian pressure and whether subsequent
appropriators Whose withdrawals of water lower the water
table and reduce the flow of prior wells, must restore the
pressure or bear the expense of replacing the water of prior
appropriators. The majority ruled that a subsequent appropriator of underground water whose withdrawals in-
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terfered with prior appropriators would have to cease
pumping or replace the water of prior appropriators. In
dissenting, Mr. Justice Crockett pointed out that the majority was assuming that a prior user of underground
water has an absolute right to have not only the water, but
also to have the pressure and means of diversion preserved
inviolate. He asserted that inasmuch as water rights are
assured and protected by the authority of the state, it is
logical and necessary that they be deemed to be held subject
to such conditions and limitations as are established by
law for the general good. Of particular significance is
Justice Crockett's comments with respect to the Hanson v.
Salt Lake City, supra, case at page 337:
"It is of vital significance, insofar as the authority of the Hanson case is concerned, that Justice Wolfe and Latimer in concurring opinions
pointed out that prior appropriators of underground
water should not be deemed to get an absolute right
to pressure, but only to the water; and that the
means of diversion must be reasonable and consistent with the state of development of water in the
area and not inimical to the overall purpose of putting all of the usable water in the basin to use. In
a special concurrence in the result, Chief Justice
Pratt in different words concurred with that conclusion saying, 'The rule as to reasonable and economical use of water applies as well to methods of
diversion as it does to the application of the water
to the land itself/ These observations were made in
apprehension of the very problems that have arisen
in this case. As I view it, they are not inconsistent
with the statute and are in conformity with the
basic objective which must necessarily underlie our
water law."
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The Colorado Supreme Court in the case of the City
of Colorado Springs V. Bender, 366 P.2d 552 (1961) which
involved an action by senior appropriators of water from
an underground stream to enjoin junior appropriator from
withdrawing water, provides guidance at page 555:
"At his own point of diversion on a natural
water course, each diverter must establish some reasonable means of effectuating his diversion. He is
not entitled to command the whole or a substantial
flow of the stream merely to facilitate his taking
the fraction of the whole flow to which he is entitled. Schodde V. Twin Falls Land & Water Co.,
224 U.S. 107, 119, 32 S.Ct. 470, 56 L.ed. 686. This
principle applied to diversion of underflow or underground water means that priority of appropriation does not give a right to an inefficient means of
diversion, such as a well which reaches to such a
shallow depth into the available water supply that
a shortage would occur to such senior even though
diversion by others did not deplete the stream below where there would be an adequate supply for
the senior's lawful demand."
In discussing what should be done by the trial court on
remand, the Colorado Supreme Court at page 556 said:
"The court must determine what, if anything,
the plaintiffs should be required to do to make more
efficient the facilities at their point of diversion,
due regard being given to the purposes for which
the appropriation had been made and the 'economic
reach/ of plaintiffs. The plaintiffs cannot reasonably 'command the whole' source of supply merely
to facilitate the taking by them of the fraction of
the entire flow to which their senior appropriation
entitles them. On the dther hand, plaintiffs cannot
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be required to improve their extraction facilities
beyond their economic reach upon a consideration
of all the factors involved."
If it is necessary in the decision of this case or in defining what is a "vested right" as it appears in Section
73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, the Utah Supreme
Court should not hesitate on this narrow point to reverse
Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, supra. Certainly,
the decisions of this Court in the past make it clear that
the Utah Court has properly adjusted the rules of law to
meet arising problems and modern developments pertaining
to use of water in Utah. In the early decisions, the Supreme
Court followed the common law concept of absolute ownership of ground water by the overlying landowner. Willow
Creek Irr. Co. V. Michaelson, 21 U. 248, 60 P. 943 (1900).
In Home V. Utah Oil Refining Co., 59 Utah 279, 202 P. 815
(1921), the ownership rule was abandoned in favor of the
doctrine of correlative rights. Shortly thereafter, in Glover
V. Utah Oil Refinery Co., 62 Utah 174, 218 P. 955 (1923)
the Court modified the correlative right doctrine to allow
an owner to transport his proportionate share of the water
out of the basin. In 1935, the correlative rights doctrine
was rejected by the court in two decisions (Wrathall V.
Johnson, 86 U. 50, 40 P.2d 744 (1935) and Justesen V.
Olsen, 86 U. 158, 40 P.2d 802 (1935)) which adopted in
its place the doctrine of prior appropriation.
So we respectfully submit that the Utah Supreme
Court should now adopt the rule of law which would define
"vested right" in Section 73-3-3 as meaning that while an
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appropriator of underground water is entitled to the quantity of water that he diverts and beneficially uses, nevertheless, his means of diversion must continue to be reasonable and consistent with the development of the area. No
longer should an appropriator of underground water be entitled absolutely and unreasonably to maintenance of the
hydrostatic or artesian pressure that happened to exist at
the time of his original appropriation.

CONCLUSION
Maximum beneficial use of available water should be
the guiding policy in defining rights to the use thereof. An
appropriative, usufructuary right should be defined in
terms which would permit further appropriations or change
applications for appropriations to the fullest extent possible within the safe yield of an underground source so long
as the pumping lift is economically reasonable. Utah Law
Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, Page 192.
This Court should now take advantage of the opportunity to adopt the rule of reasonableness in the area here
involved Which would result in the greatest development
of underground water basins in Utah and the most beneficial use of the waters contained therein in the public interest. The State Engineer needs guidance which will allow
him to administer the water laws of Utah so as to obtain
the highest and best use of the waters of Utah. The rule
of reasonableness which is in harmony with the opinions
of Justices Crockett, Wolfe and Latimer, as noted above,
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should now be adopted by this Court, and the trial court's
decision in this matter should be reversed with appropriate
instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
CALVIN A. BEHLE and
JAMES B. LEE
of
Parsons, Behle, Evans & Latimer
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper
Corporation
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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